Sena Akalin
On Behalf of
DIYARBAKIR BAR ASSOCIATION
Local Partners (In Association With)
Diyarbakir Newspaper
Diyarbakir Kurdish Institute
Diyarbakir Business Womenʼs Association
Dilce University Department of Sociology
Bogazici University Political Science Department
Sabanci University Conflict Analysis and Resolution Program
Municipality of Van
Municipality of Dersim
Municipality of Siirt
Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association MUSIAD
Democratic Free Womenʼs Movement (DOKH) Turkey
HUMAN Rights Foundation of Turkey
Peace and Democracy Party (BDP)
Human Rights Associations Diyarbakir Branch
Istanbul Kurdish Institute
Republican Peopleʼs Party (CHP) Diyarbakir Branch
Justice and Development Party Diyarbakir Branch
Association of Businessmen of Organized Industrial Zone of Diyarbakir (DOSIAD)
The Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People ( MAZLUMDER)
Prepared for
TESEV - Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation
January 15, 2011
SUMMARY
Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, policies of assimilation were
implemented against Kurds and other minorities.1 A national identity was created which ignored
differences in ethnicity, religion, language, and belief. It was at first believed that assimilation would effectively ‘solve’ Turkeys Kurdish issue; when this didn’t work, the problem was perceived as a problem of terror, once again ignoring the economic, social, cultural, and identity dimensions.2 This continuous false diagnosis of the Kurdish issue has resulted in an increasing number of human rights violations in Turkey and has revealed the issue to the international community.
Several key points have been highlighted for the implementation of a second-track solution;
a. The definition of citizenship in Turkey, which should give more importance to avoid
discriminatory criteria emerging from religious, ethnic, and class differences. By starting a
discussion about the definition of citizenship we aim to speed up the process of finding
alternative ways to construct a new citizenship form which would embrace every religion
and ethnicity living in Turkey.
b. The existing difficulties resulting from language policies still hinders the Kurdish
population from freely expressing themselves. Therefore throughout the negotiations
between the Kurdish interest groups, academics, Kurdish civilians living in Southeastern
region and government institutions we would try to construct a political will that would
seek the most effective solution to eliminate linguistic discrimination.
c. We would also like to contribute the economic and social development of Southeastern
Anatolia. We believe that its crucial to initiate a debate between state institution officials,
Kurdish institutes, intellectuals, the business community, and human rights movements to
find viable solutions to unemployment, lack of investment which causes a stagnation of
the local economy, lowering living conditions of Kurdish population in the region and at
the same time generate the violence and polarization.
d. The distortion and corruption of power in unitary states and discussion of alternative
solutions such decentralization of power and strengthening the municipalities would be the
last theme that this second track initiative would focus on. Today although there is a
current discussion on this topic by gathering different opinions we would like to accelerate
the process of finding a functional solution to the lack of local representation problem.
In addition to assessing the ongoing Turkish-Kurdish conflict and recommending a second-track initiative, this paper will attempt to bring local organizations and institutions into
the debate, highlighting the pros and cons of such an alternative to determine its overall
feasibility. Finally, the proposal will be presented to the Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation (TESEV), as a possible source of funding or approval in order to implement the
recommended second-track solution.
The Turkish-Kurdish conflict traces its roots back to the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire. During World War I, Kurds supported the Ottoman cause and fought with the Turkish
Army against the Allied powers. During the establishment of the Turkish Republic, Kurdish
landlords in charge of vast amounts of land in Southeastern Anatolia came into an agreement
with the Turkish government to be included into Turkish territories. Since the very beginning, the
underrepresentation and denial of the Kurdish identity made it impossible for Kurds living under
Turkish rule to be accepted as a different ethnicity. Kurdish politicians elected to represent their
community suffered from severe effects of assimilation and discrimination policies of different
Turkish governments. In order to have a neutral public sphere which would recognize and embrace all kinds of different ethnicities and cultures, Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals tried repeatedly to seek alternative peaceful ways to cease the polarization and the ongoing war
between Kurdish extremists (PKK Kurdistan Workers Party) and Turkish Army. The ongoing war between PKK guerrillas and the Turkish State started in the early 1980s for several reasons,
most importantly the oppression of Kurdish ethnicity. Due to the limited existence of state
institutions in Southeastern Anatolia, the feudalist customs strengthened and caused Kurdish
population to suffer from bad living conditions, lack of education and social security. After the
capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan the number of violent clashes decreased and expedited
the process of talks of peace during the last years. However, the demonstrations and attacks
which caused the death of many people and also the banning four different Kurdish political
parties within 20 years clearly demonstrates the gravity of the Kurdish conflict. As former
Turkish Foreign Minister Ilter Turkmen eloquently explains the Kurdish problem is Turkey’s
“biggest failure.”
Today the parties involved in the conflict are represented as Turkish government and
PKK, however when looked in a wider perspective, the number of stakeholders and interest
groups involved in the conflict are more. There is a common misconception that all Kurdish
people living under the Turkish state sympathize with PKK’s (Kurdish Working Party) causes
and share their ideology, values, and demands. Today unlike PKK, Kurds living in Southeastern
Anatolia region are not necessarily looking for an independent Kurdish state. During the local
elections in 1999, Diyarbakir, the city with the biggest Kurdish population, gave its majority of
the votes to Democratic Society Party (65.43% DTP, Turkey’s main Kurdish political party) and
Justice and Development Party (31.57% AKP) This important detail shows us that the majority
of the Kurds find the idea of separation and formation of an independent Kurdish state in
Southeastern Anatolia region undesirable.
The different Kurdish interest groups currently trying to represent the Kurdish community generally articulate their demands in peaceful ways. But as mentioned before, the banning of major Kurdish political parties causes a great harm to continue peaceful means of negotiation. On the other hand, sometimes conflicting interests of important figures in opposing parties such as Turkish army, nationalist movement party, republican people’s party, and PKK makes it very difficult to achieve a common ground. At the risk of being banned, Kurdish activists and politicians continue attempts to form political parties to differentiate their demands from PKK and to articulate their demands in legal terms. The last party to be banned, DTP (Democratic Society Party), continued their efforts to express their willingness to cooperate with other Turkish political parties, Kurdish local groups from Southeastern Anatolia and human rights activists until they were finally banned by the Constitutional Court on December 11 2009.4
In order to fully understand the demands of each stakeholder, it is crucial to analyze the
alliances established between Kurdish intellectual groups (i.e. Istanbul Kurdish Institute),
political science departments of major Southeastern Anatolian universities (i.e. Dicle University,
Hakkari University), municipalities of major cities in the same region as Diyarbakir, Siirt and
Van. Furthermore, the ongoing activities of progressive professionals such as lawyers,
industrialists, women associations and entrepreneurs of Southeastern Anatolia continue paving
the way for possible solutions to the Turkish - Kurdish conflict. All these groups listed above
first of all seek to have a more stable and peaceful Southeastern Anatolian region. By peace they
mean the end of the ongoing violent conflict between the separatists PKK guerrillas and Turkish
army. In order to differentiate their demands from PKK separatists motivations, groups representing Kurdish minority such as Peace and Democracy Party keep emphasizing the issue
of recognition of Kurdish identity and its language by Turkish state. The second important
demand of these groups is the strengthening the local representation. In order to achieve this
goal, they keep organizing panels, debates, publishing articles that demonstrate the lack of local representation due to the negatives effects of unitary state model.
From its establishment, the Turkish elite and members of first official ruling party CHP
favored the unitary state model in order to stop any kind of separatist movements in different
parts of state territories. Therefore any kind of structural change in state model would be
considered very radical by Turkish ultra-nationalist fractions and Turkish army. As expected the
agenda of ultra-nationalists differs a lot from the interest groups that are representing the Kurdish minority. First of all radical fractions of nationalist movement party and peoples republic party .feverishly oppose any change to the unitary state model. They argue that a federal Turkish state with strong local governments would lead to separatists movements and a bloody dissolution process. It would not be wrong to state that agenda setting of Turkish ultra-nationalists fractions and interest groups very much related to the demands of Kurdish groups. Imposition of one language for Turkish nationalists became one of the most crucial issues in recent years. In order to run a counter agenda Turkish ultra-nationalists with the support of key figures in mass media continuing to prepare campaigns that praise the uniqueness of the Turkish identity and how it should be protected from the influences of minorities.
Unlike academics, local business associations, human rights groups, spoilers like ultranationalists groups and radical PKK supporters are very much focused on expanding their
activities to destroy the efforts of parties on both sides who try to achieve a common ground in
negotiations. From early 2008 onwards, the Turkish government started the process of “Kurdish
Initiative.” On January 1, 2009, after the approval of parliament, the launch of the only Kurdish
language TV channel (TRT-6) by the state-owned Turkish Radio and Television, showed the
good-will of the ruling party AKP to start a new initiative aimed at ending the continuing cultural
oppression of Kurds. Opposition parties such as CHP (Republican People’s Party) and MHP
(Nationalist Action Part) for the first time approached this new process in a very positive way,
only becoming critical when AKP shared its new plan about the negotiation of the peaceful
surrender of 30 PKK members and 4 children on October 21 2009.
During the peaceful surrender, DTP prepared a massive reception rally in Diyarbakir, in this very symbolic ceremony, 30 former PKK member took out their mountain gear and wore
civilian clothes as a way of conveying their intention to lay down their arms and integrate into to the society. Careful legal and security operatives also followed their strict orders verbatim: they welcomed the PKK members without arresting them and took them to a lodging facility, where a ‘mobile court’ could walk them through the surrendering process.5
On the one hand, this rally set a good example to other PKK members in the mountains;
they could surrender peacefully, and they could be received well, and unharmed. But from the
Turks’ perspective the rally included almost everything Turks had stood against and considered
‘alarming’. Abdullah Öcalan (PKK’s founder and the former leader) posters, fireworks, flying of
the Kurdish flag and singing of the Kurdish anthem, were all more than enough to infuriate the
Turks who read about and watched this event from TV and newspaper sources that also played
their part in amplifying all negative aspects of the situation.
While the Turks had expected PKK members to disarm and surrender to the authorities as
a show of regret and remorse, the DTP had reframed the entire debacle as ‘the proof that the
Kurds have won’ and their decades’-old demands were finally accepted by the Turkish state. As
H Akin Unver explains, this event halts the promising Kurdish initiative of the ruling party. The
general perception of Turkish society towards a possible solution in Turkish - Kurdish conflict is deteriorated due to the feverish campaign of Turkish ultra-nationalists to represent the plan of peaceful surrounding and the whole “Kurdish Initiative” as a humiliation for Turkish identity.
The attempt to start a peaceful negotiation process was finally blocked by extremists in
both parties and with the massive propaganda that once again misinterpreted the Kurdish
intentions and showed the whole Kurdish population as a potential threat to Turkish society.
After this ineffectual attempt to resolve the Turkish - Kurdish conflict, the ban of Democratic
Society Party (DTP, Kurdish party) in the end of 2009 halted the process of peace between the
conflicting groups.
Non-governmental organizations, human rights activists, business men and women
associations of Southeastern Anatolia, educators, Kurdish institutes, local and some other big
newspapers such as Radikal, and also intellectuals from both sides kept trying to find alternative ways to put an end to the armed conflict that has been going on for 15 years between PKK and Turkish state which took a toll of more than 37,000 lives and cost more than 200 billion US dollars.The panels and peace campaigns such as the 7th International Conference which was
held in Brussels, ‘EU, Turkey and the Kurds” “The Road to Peace - Facing the Challenge 9 (17th
- 18th November 2010), a peace campaign: “Looking for five-hundred thousand radicals who
would say yes to Stop fighting start negotiating” (Savasma Konus diyen 500 bin Radikal
Araniyor)10 that has been started by one of the major newspapers of Turkey, Radikal, can be seen
as solid examples of attempting to achieving peace through second-track negotiations.
FUTURE SCENARIOS
In todays circumstances, the plausible alternative future scenarios vary due to the actions
and decisions taken by important figures on both Turkish and Kurdish sides. In our opinion there
are four alternative scenarios which might take place in Turkish - Kurdish conflict in the short
run.
BEST SCENARIO
The possibility to move towards a steady and ambitious peaceful process is very little at the
moment. In order to accomplish this scenario, the ruling party AKP would have to give a new
start to the “Kurdish Initiative “ and begin official negotiations not only with the recently banned
Kurdish party DTP, but also with the founder and former leader of PKK Abdullah Ocalan who
has been kept in a private island prison in Imrali. After the official negotiations between Turkish
government and the leading figures in DTP and Ocalan, both sides might come up with a durable
solution which would first end the ongoing war between Turkish army and PKK and accelerate
the return of guerrillas from the mountains and their integration with society. Later on a possible
in depth analysis of the unsolved economical and social problems of the Southeastern Anatolia
region may lead the leaders of the both groups to start on considering to work on the application
of a more functional state model which would strengthen the role of local representation and
neutralize the public space by giving equal cultural rights to every minority group. As it
mentioned above the possibility to achieve this scenario is very low. Because currently the
spoilers such as Turkish ultra-nationalists and PKK guerillas trying to keep the level of tension
very high. This prevents the moderates from both sides from solving the conflict.
WORST CASE SCENARIO
Today, peace spoilers continue to block any kind of alternative peaceful way to solve the
Turkish-Kurdish conflict. These attempts often reach a level in which moderate parties from both
sides are not capable of preventing the escalation of the conflict. In a situation like this, Kurdish
guerrilla movement PKK can apply a new strategy which would persuade the young Kurdish
generations to radicalize and join the separatist movement. In a situation like this the reaction
coming from the Turkish army would be as strong and as brutal as the agitator. This would
further polarize the conflict and nullify concrete positive steps taken so far with great efforts. In
addition to this , during times of high conflict , society would be further terrorized, especially
the Kurdish minority which does not affiliate with PKK, who would lose their credibility to
negotiate by democratic means. Due to the high level of conflict, the response of the
international community towards the death toll would be disastrous for Turkey’s long attempt to
recover its deteriorated image since its invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the so-called Armenian
Genocide. This would also harm the process of integration into European Union.
BUSINESS AS USUAL
This scenario is similar to current situation, in that the moderate groups of both sides are
stalled due to the constant spoiling attempts of radicals of both sides. Negotiations through
official means are constantly blocked by ultra-nationalist propaganda. Due to constant pressure
coming from opposition parties, the ruling party is not capable of finding a common ground
which would please both Kurdish minority and Turkish nationalists. The slowness of the official
process and societal pessimism would decrease the expectations to reach a favorable agreement
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in the short-run. However, this would not stop the activities of grass-root organizations
representing both Kurdish and Turkish sides in favor of peace, another slow process.
SECOND- TRACK SCENARIO
In addition to the previously mentioned scenarios there are “ second track” scenarios which
rely on a different approaches . Sustainable peace can only come from a long process of
negotiations between the people who actually suffer from the severe consequences of the
conflict. In a situation like this these people would gather together to form grass root
organizations to articulate their demands and foster a peaceful negotiation process. Business
associations, academics, human right activists, women’s rights groups, and independent media
currently working to strengthen the socioeconomic conditions of Southeastern Anatolia can
foster an alternative roadmap towards sustainable peace.
Of the scenarios mentioned above, the most preferred overall outcomes for both parties
are the best-case scenario and second-track scenario. These scenarios would provide equal rights
and representation to Kurds and mitigate the influence of PKK, allowing thousands of guerrillas
to integrate peacefully into society. Furthermore once the parties would resolve the conflict, the
Turkish government would have a chance to benefit from a more desirable socioeconomic
condition in Southeastern Anatolia and also accelerate the European Union integration process,
recovering from its tarnished human rights record.
On the other hand, the best overall outcome for each party without official negotiations
(i.e. dialogue between the Kurdish party DTP, PKK, Turkish government, and leading generals of
Turkish Army) would come from the gathering of grass-roots organizations, small local business
associations, independent media, educators and human right activists. Although their power is
less then that of the official groups, they are more effective in articulating the needs of the local
population and capable of gathering different opinions to reach a consensus.
PROPOSED SECOND TRACK INITIATIVE
The purpose of a second-track initiative is to foster an alternative peaceful negotiation
process. With the following conference proposal, our organization, the Diyarbakir Bar
Association, aims to bring together leaders of regional industrial groups, businessmen, local and
international independent media actors, human rights organizations, conflict resolution experts,
well-informed academics, religious figures, local representatives of leading political parties, and
municipalities of major cities in Southeastern Anatolia. In bringing these different groups
together we aim to reach a consensus on an alternative roadmap which would;
1) Discuss and reevaluate the extension of the definition of citizenship in current Turkish
constitution in order to neutralize the public sphere. This will be done in consultation with
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Human Rights Association Diyarbakir Branch, the
Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People (MAZLUM-DER).
2)Work on an education plan consisting of the involvement of Kurdish language and literature as
an elective course in schools and bring Kurdish language professors together with the leading
university staff in Southeastern Anatolia to organize and implement in-depth education plans,
organize a campaign with the help of independent media sources such as Diyarbakir
Newspaper to increase pressure on parliament to implement this plan.
3)A long-term socioeconomic model to address the needs of the regional population, through the
involvement of independent industrial groups (i.e. Independent Industrialists and Businessmen
Association MUSIAD, Diyarbakir Business Women’s Association, Association of
Businessmen of Organized Industrial Zone of Diyarbakir (DOSIAD), and regional
municipalities (i.e. Municipalities of Dersim, Diyarbakir, Siirt, and Van). Preparing workshops in order to discuss an alternative solutions that have been occurring due
to the power distortion and corruption in the unitary state model. Bringing the representative
of ruling party (AKP) and two other important parties local representatives (i.e. CHP and
MHP) municipalities of four major cities in the Southeastern Anatolia (i.e. Dersim, Diyarbakir,
Siirt, and Van) and political science department staff of local and other public and private
universities (i.e. Dicle, Hakkari, Bogazici, Sabanci Universities) to discuss alternative ways to
increase the effectiveness of local representation.
The Diyarbakir Bar Association with the support of Turkish Economic and Social Studies
Foundation is willing to bring together all these groups that has been mentioned above to discuss
these four major issues. Although all organizations and associations are welcomed to participate
in debates on every issue. the full participation of the leaders of human rights groups (i.e
Diyarbakir Bar Association, Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, Human Rights Association
Diyarbakir Branch, the Association of Human Rights and Solidarity for Oppressed People
(MAZLUM-DER) is crucial in the debates of extension of the definition of citizenship in Turkish
constitution. Independent industrial organizations, regional business men and women
associations and municipalities of major Southeastern Anatolia would be the leading figures to
discuss a sustainable socioeconomic model to bring prosperity to the region and raise the living
standards of the Kurdish minority. Institutions specialized in education such as Istanbul Kurdish
Institution, Dicle, Hakkari Universities and independent media actors such as Diyarbakir
Newspaper, would participate the debates on language discrimination and promotion of learning
kurdish language in schools. Conflict Analysis and Resolution Program of Sabanci University
would also participate in the workshops which local municipalities and major party
representatives would discuss alternative solutions to power distortion and corruption in unitary
state models in order to facilitate to reach a consensus.
During the conference, our organization, the Diyarbakir Bar Association would ask all
parties to express their expectations from the roadmap that would be created in the the
conference in order to reach a realistic solution. In addition to this we would ask each
organization to address their concerns about the conflict and explain specifically the role of their
organization and how their organizations or associations are effected by the Turkish- Kurdish
conflict.
In addition to the conference, specific activities and workshops would be organized to
bring the listed parties further together; including retreats and empathy workshops. However, in
our scenario conflict-resolution workshops are not necessarily required because the parties
concerned are moderate and peace-seeking. The conference and workshops would address the
issue of Kurdish integration and representation within Turkey, rather than confront extremists of
both sides.
One of the expected outcomes of the proposed conference would be the creation of a new
development program called Southeast Anatolian Economic Sustainability Program, which
would be formed by experts seeking ways to increase the prosperity in the Southeastern Anatolia
region. In order to accomplish a functioning long run socioeconomic model in the region, every
year Turkey’s leading economists and statistic experts would be invited to evaluate the progress
that has been achieved. In addition to this, we also aim to form a educational institution which
would specialize in promotion of Kurdish language education activities which would increase
cultural awareness; named Kurdish Language Institute. Furthermore, a regulatory commission
would be created to oversee and evaluate all aspects of this second-track solution; the Southeast
Anatolian Turkish - Kurdish Policy Institute.
By drafting the legal documents to create these organizations, the Diyarbakir Bar
Association would be a critical part of the second-track process. Furthermore we would bring
four major municipalities of Southeastern Anatolia region to document the needs and demands of
Kurdish population and address it to Turkish Parliament. By the end of the conference we aim to
publish a report which would explain the roadmap to reach our four major goals that have been
mentioned. We expect the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation to whom we address
our conference proposal, to financially support us to continue our annual conferences to improve
regional relations between moderate Kurds and Turks.
The creation of the Southeast Anatolian Turkish - Kurdish Policy Institute, Southeast
Anatolian Economic Sustainability Program, and the Kurdish Language Institute, would be a
desirable outcome of the proposed second-track solution. Currently no plans exist to create these
organizations through official processes. To promote these institutions and publicize the
outcomes of our conference we must work together with the independent media.
REFERENCES
Beriker N 2009, 'Kurt Meselesi ve Uyusmazlik Cozumu ( Conflict Resolution) Yaklasimi',
Sabanci University Conflict Analysis Program, Washington, .
Celik, A B. Role of the European Institutions on the Resolution of Kurdish Conflict, Sabanci
University .
Erbey, M 2009, HUMAN RIGHTS,THE KURDISH ISSUE AND TURKEY [online], Human
Rights Association, Available from: http://www.ihd.org.tr/english/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=675:human-rightsthe-kurdish-issue-andturkey&
catid=17:special-reports&Itemid=37 [Accessed: 10.1.2011].
Unver, H. A. 2010, 'Turkey's 'Kurdish initiative': What went wrong? (Or did it?)', Turkish Policy
Center, Washington, .
Human Rights Watch 2009, Turkey: Kurdish Party Banned [online], Available from: http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/12/11/turkey-kurdish-party-banned [Accessed: 15.1.2011].
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